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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF u·TAH 
DALE ,V. CORBRIDGE and 
DORLENE CORBRIDGE, hus-
band and wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
l\I. nIORRIN & SONS, INC., a Cor-
poration, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
10853 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover for personal injury 
sustained by the plaintiff Dorlene Corbridge, as a result 
of a fall into a deep excavation made and maintained 
by the defendant, a road construction contractor. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After the complaint and answer had been fil d e and 
the case was set for pre-trial hearing the def d ' en ant 
moved for a summary judgment. The Court t , . gran ed 
defendants motion for summary judgment and th 
plaintiff has appealed. e 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs ask that the judgment of the Lower 
Court be reversed and the case remanded for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 31st day of August, 1965, at approximately 
10:30 p.m., the plaintiff, Dorlene Corbridge, was driv· 
ing an automobile owned by her husband in a northerly 
direction on Highway #89, toward Ogden, Utah. She 
was returning with her children from a recreational out-
ing at the Lagoon Amusement Park in Davis County, 
At this time the defendant was involved in con-
struction of the new highway between Ogden and Hill 
Field Road, and also making certain repairs upon said 
highway. The defendant had dug a large excavation 
(approximately 15 feet deep) across the existing 
highway at the mouth of Weber Canyon. The 
purpose of the excavation was to install a cement 
culvert to carry the water in a presently existing 
canal from the east side of the highway underneath 
the highway to the west. The defendant had in· 
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stalled detour signs 2 or 3 hundred yards north and 
o:outh of the excavation itself to route the traffic around 
the excavation and to the west of the presently existing 
higlnvay, but there were no barriers, barricades or warn-
ing <levices in the immediate vicinity of the excavation 
itself. 
Immediately to the east of the excavation site was 
i large sand and gravel pit and immediately to the 
,1est of the existing highway was another large sand 
and gravel pit owned and operated by a different com-
pany. Since the excavation took place at this particular 
location, the detour road was relatively narrow and only 
all<n,-ed one lane of traffic in each direction over a dirt 
road. 
As the plaintiff proceeded in a northerly direction 
and before reaching the construction area, her auto-
mobile ceased to operate and she coasted down the 
hill from the Hill Field Road. Her car was moving 
very slowly as she approached the construction site. 
She coasted her automobile just to the north of the 
detour sign on the south end of the construction, pulled 
her car off the road and stopped. (Dep. p. 8). At the 
time she stopped her car she observed nothing else in 
the area because it was a very dark night. (Dep. p. 8). 
She alighted from her car and a passing motorist of-
fered her a ride. She returned to her automobile to 
instruct the children to remain in the car, keep the 
windmvs rolled up and the automobile locked until 
she returned. She was going to get a ride near Ogden 
and seek assistance to help her start the automobile. 
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While she was giving the said instructions to he h'J . r c 1. 
dren, the traffic was heavy on the detour port' ,, ion 01 
the road and the lady who stopped to render assist 
ancr 
was farced to move on the north to the other side . 
h . m t e excavation because she was "afraid she would (fet 
hit" by the north-bound vehicles. (Dep. 8-9). Th~re 
was not room on the detour road for the traffic to gii 
around her. 
The plaintiff had observed the actions of her bene. 
factor and saw the car pull around to the other side 
of the detour road. At that time she could see the tail 
lights of the automobile and she proceeded to walk 
directly toward the lights. (Dep. p. 9). She could not 
estimate the distance she' had walked because it was 
dark and she saw nothing in the direction that she was 
walking except the tail lights of the other automobile. 
She felt nothing unusual under her feet although she 
could not see the ground because it was extremely 
dark and the excavation and construction site was 
unlighted. As she proceeded in a northerly direction 
she fell into the open excavation made by the defendant 
and impaled her body upon the reinforcement concrete 
steel rods that protruded from the partially completed 
canal and received serious and permanent injury as 
a result of the fall. A short while later other motorists 
saw the disabled automobile, stopped to render assist· 
ance and heard the plaintiff moaning at the bottom 
of the excavation. They then secured a flashlight, found 
the injured plaintiff, summoned aid and she was trans· 
ported to the hospital in Ogden. 
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Prior to the time the plaintiff fell into the excava-
tion, she saw no lumber, concrete forms or other debris 
that would indicate the presence of an excavation (Dep. 
P· 12) and was completely unaware of the excavation. 
The plaintiff was not really familiar with the area 
in which the construction was taking place. She had 
driYm pa.st the area from a different direction earlier 
thnt day on her way to the outing at Lagoon, but had 
not Leen on the route for 6 months prior to the date 
11f the accident. On the night of the accident, the weather 
·,1·as windy, cold, and very dark near the construction 
site. (Dep. p. 6). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS A DRASTIC 
REMEDY AND SHOULD BE GRANTED 
ONLY WHEN UNDER THE FACTS VIEWED 
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF 
SHE SHOULD NOT RECOVER AS A MAT-
TER O:F LAW. 
In Auto Lease Company v. Central Mutual In-
surance Co., 7 Utah 2d 336, 325 P.2d 264, the Utah 
Supreme Court said at page 265, 
"The Motion for Summary Judgment is, in 
effect, a demurrer to the contentions of the ad-
verse party, saying : 'Conceding the facts to be as 
you claim, there is no basis for recovery'." 
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The position of the Utah court is also very 1 c earh· 
spelled out in Welchman v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25 , ~ 
P d 
. , 33, 
.2 410, decided by the Utah Supreme Court in 19. 
h .d n9 t e court sa1 at page 411, ' 
"Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and 
the courts shoul~ be reluctant to deprive litigants 
o~ an opportu~1ty to fully present their conten. 
hons upon a trial. It should be granted only whe 
under the facts viewed in the light most favorabi° 
to the plaintiff he could not recover as a matte~ 
of law." 
The burden of the defendant asking summarr 
judgment in this kind of situation is great and th~t 
burden is clearly defined in Baker v. Decker ,117 Utah 
15, 212 P.2d 679, decided by the Utah Supreme Court 
in 1949 where the court said at page 682, 
"We must keep in mind that the burden is 
upon the defendant to establish this claim anu 
that unless all reasonable minds must conclude 
that Mrs. Baker was negligent in the manner in 
which she attempted to get over the canvas the 
question of her due care must be submitted to 
the jury for determination .... Ordinary, reason· 
able persons will trip over objects, stumble over 
obstructions, slip on slick surf aces and fall into 
holes or excavations. Even though they may see 
the object they sometimes fail to comprehend ana 
anticipate the incident which precipitates the in· 
jury. Usually whether a reasonable person wouU 
have properly appraised the situation mul 
escaped injury is for a jury to determine." (Em· 
phasis added) 
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Based upon the deposition and affidavit of the 
plaintiff, Dorlene Corbridge,. it appears clear that she 
was not aware of the excavation. She was faced with an 
emergency because her car had failed to operate, she 
had her children with her, she was worried about the 
safety of her children as she sought assistance. When 
her benefactor stopped to render her aid she stopped 
:wJmentarily in the detour road but observing the heavy 
traffic and recognizing the danger of remaining there 
sbe told the plaintiff, "I am going to pull up around 
:.iways because I am afraid I will get hit here." (Dep. 
p. 9 :. , The plaintiff did not see any lights, signs, signals 
or bnrricades around the excavation or any warning 
whatever that an excavation was in fact present. (Aff. 
p. J .i Plaintiff stated in her affidavit that she was afraid 
to walk into the detoured area of the road because the 
traffic was heavy and she too was afraid she would be hit 
and since she could see her benefactor's tail lights she 
walked directly toward the tail lights when she fell into 
the excavation. (Aff, p. 2) 
The sole question involving plaintiff's conduct is 
whether a reasonable person would have properly ap-
praised the situation and thereby escaped the injury. 
Considering the nature of her circumstance, the emer-
gency, the lack of light, lack of knowledge that the 
excavation was present and posing the danger for her, 
it cannot be said that all reasonable minds would con-
clude that she failed to act in a reasonable manner. 
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POINT II 
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A SUBSTITUTE 
FOR ATRIAL. 
Plaintiffs readily concede that the summary jud . 
ment procedure is a valuable device to pierce the alleg!. 
tions of the pleading and if there is in fact no genuine 
issue as to material fact the delay and expense of liti-
gation should and ought to be avoided. However, Jus-
tice Callister made clear the purpose of Rule 56, in 
Dupler v. Yates, IO Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 where 
the court said at page 636, 
"Rule 56 U.R.C.P. is not intended to provide 
a substitute for the regular trial of cases in which 
there are disputed issues of fact upon which the 
outcome of the litigation depends. And it should 
be invoked with caution to the end that litigants 
may be afforded a trial where there exists be-
tween them a bona fide dispute of material fact." 
The court reaffirmed that philosophy in Tanner v. 
Utah Poultry and Farrners Cooperative, 11 Utah 2d 
353, 359 P.2d 18 at page 19, where the court said, 
"A summary judgment is appropriate only 
where the favored party makes a showing which 
precludes, as a matter of law, the awarding of 
any relief to the losing party." 
The court should consider the facts of this case 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff Dorlene Cor· 
bridge as Justice Crockett pointed out in Morris v. 
8 
Farnsworth Motel, et al., 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297, 
where the court said at page 298, 
"Under such circumstances, the party against 
·whom the summary judgment is granted, is 
entitled to the benefit of having the court con-
sider all of the facts presented, and every inf er-
ence fairly arising therefrom in the light most 
favorable to him." 
If we view the facts most favorable to the plaintiff 
Dorlene Corbridge, we must necessarily conclude that 
it was very dark outside, that she was completely un-
;nvare of the excavation, that she was faced with an 
.~mergency that required her to either walk through the 
construction area or walk upon the detour road that 
was heavily traveled at that time and upon which she 
had already concluded it was unsafe to walk. We must 
also conclude that the defendant had failed to place a 
barricade or any kind of a device arouad the excavation 
to prevent persons from falling into it, or to light it 
or place any kind of warning device upon it to give 
notice to anyone who may be in that area and inclined 
to fall into the excavation. 
The defendant has moved for summary judgment 
upon the grounds that the plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent in that she was walking in a known construc-
tion area when it was so dark she could see no objects 
around her; further, claiming that she assumed the risk 
when she went into the area marked off by the detour 
signs and a barricade. 
The proposition that the question of contributory 
9 
negligence is for the jury to determine is funda 
mental 
and does not deserve a great deal of attention I 
iere 
See Moore v. Miles, 108 Utah 167, 158 P.2d 676 . · 
which the court held, ' lJl 
"I~ this jurisdiction. we are committed to the 
doctrine that the question of contributorv ne 1. . f h . J gi. gence is one or t e Jury, where as said in Car-
penter v. Syrett, 99 Utah 208, 104 P.2d 6l" 
. 619, 'different conclusions may be reasonabl~ 
drawn by different minds from the same evj. 
dence'." 
POINT III 
MERE KNOWLEDGE OF A DANGER 
OUS CONDITION IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO 
DEFEAT RECOVERY. 
Even if we assume that the plaintiff, Dorlene Cor· 
bridge, was aware of the construction there is no evi- ' 
dence that she was aware of the excavation and she was 
clearly not aware of the extent of the danger at the 
time of her injury. A recent pertinent case in Utah 
is Baker v. Decker, 117 Utah 15, 212 P.2d 679, decided 
by our court in 1949, where the court said at page 682, 
citing a prior Utah decision, 
"It is well settled that mere knowledge that a 
walk is dangerous, unsafe for travel, is not suffi· 
cient to establish contributory negligence though 
there is another way that is safe and convenient, 
and to defeat recovery, it must appear that the 
traveler knew or as an ordinary cautious person 
should have known that it was imprudent to use 
the walk." 
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In the Baker case, a 71-year-old woman tripped 
on a canvas spread over the floor of the hallway of her 
apartment house by painters who were painting, paper-. 
ing and cleaning the hallway. And the court found that 
ev~n a person of advanced years with limited eyesight 
and judgment was not contributorily negligent as a 
matter of law in using the somewhat dangerous passage-
way. 
Further conceding that even if the plaintiff were 
aware of the dangerous condition of the roadway prior 
to the time of her injury, her forgetfulness of the danger 
does not amount to contributory negligence. See Bick-
lwrri vs. Southern California Edison, 263 P.2d 32 de-
cided by the Court of Appeals in the Second District of 
California in 1953 held: 
"To forget is not negligence, unless it shows 
the want of ordinary care, and it is a question 
for the jury. It is settled beyond question that 
if one has knowledge of the existence of a danger-
ous condition momentary forgetfulness of the 
danger does not amount to contributory negli-
gence if there is reason to believe that he never-
theless acted with ordinary prudence and cau-
tion." 
The California Courts affirmed this position in 
Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Company, et al., 
282 P. 2d 69 ( 1955) . The court said at page 7 4, 
"Momentary forgetfulness may be in accord 
with the conduct of a reasonably prudent man." 
11 
POINT IV 
DEFENSE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK 
REQUIRES THAT THE PLAINTIFF KNEW 
OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION AND 
VOLUNTARILY SUBJECTED HERSELF TO 
THE RISK. 
The plaintiff, Dorlene Corbridge, lacked sufficient 
knowledge of the hazardous condition to have assumed 
the risk of her injury. In Clay v. Dunford, 121 Utah 
177, 239 P.2d 1075, the Utah Court said at page 1076, 
"The defense of assumption of risk as a legal . 
concept requires that the plaintiff must ban 
looked, must have seen and must have known o! 
a danger, voluntarily subjecting himself thereto 
and consenting that if injury result, he who mav 
have negligently exposed him thereto, should b'e 
relieved of any liability therefor .... 'Assump· 
tion of risk must be free and voluntary'." 
Justice Wolfe, in a concurring opinion very care· 
fully drew the distinction between assumption of risk 
and contributory negligence, where he said at page 1077, 
"But the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria . 
(assumed risk) stands outs~d~ the def e~se. of 
contributory negligence and is m no way luruted 
by it. In individual instances the two ideas some· 
times seem to cover the same ground, but care· 
lessness is not the same thing as intelligent 
choice." 
The court also said at page 1076, 
"The essential elements of assumed ris~ a:e 
knowledge, actual or implied, by the plamtiff 
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of a specific defect or dangerous condition caused 
by the negligence of the defendant in the viola-
tion of some duty owing to the plaintiff *** to-
gether with the plaintiff's appreciation of the 
danger to be encountered and his voluntary ex-
posure of himself to it." 
Obviously, if there is sufficient evidence to submit 
the question of contributory negligence to a jury, the 
court should not find as a matter of law that the plain-
tiff had assumed the risk which involves a greater degree 
elf knowledge, an intelligent choice, and a voluntary 
subjection to the risk. 
Another interesting and pertinent decision on the 
same point is Schance v. H. 0. Adams Tile Company, 
280 P.2d 851, decided by the Third District Court of 
Appeals in 1955. The court said at page 854, 
"Knowledge the danger exists is not knowl-
edge of the amount of danger necessary to charge 
a person with negligence in assuming the risk 
caused by such danger. The doing of an act with 
appreciation of the amount of danger in addition 
to mere appreciation of the danger is necessary 
in order to say as a matter of law that a person is 
negligent." 
In his brief in support of his motion for summary 
judgment the defendant has cited other cases in which 
the court did not submit the matter to the jury on find-
ing of contributory negligence as a matter of law, but 
here again, the court obviously listened to the testimony 
before making its determination. The court should at 
least do the same in the Corbridge case. 
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The defendant has in his brief in support f 1. . . 0 ll1 
motion for summary Judgment relied heavily upon 
Wold v. Ogden City, 123 Utah 270, 258 P.2d 4.13. Tl 
essence of the decision in the case was that a li'ti' le gant 
had not been deprived of his constitutional rights to , 
• • d 
Jury tnal when after the plaintiff had presented his evi-
dence the court granted defendant's motion to dism· 
IS\ 
the action because the plaintiff was contributorily negli-
gent as a matter of law. It is important to note that j11 
the Wold case the court heard all of the testimony and 
had an opportunity to pass judgment on the reasonable. 
ness of the plaintiff's conduct. The plaintiffs do not 
argue with the court's position in the Wold case. After 
the court has heard the evidence, if it determines that 
there is not basis upon which the matter can be sub-
mitted to the jury, certainly the court is entitled to grant 
defendant's motion to dismiss at that time, however. 
this does not mean nor should it be construed to mean ' 
that a court should grant a motion for summary judg 
ment before the facts are heard either by the court or a 
jury simply upon defendant's motion for summar)' 
judgment. 
In the Wold case the court found that a reasonably 
prudent person would not expose himself to a known 
danger, when there is an ewy, known and convenient 
route around it. The court necessarily had to hear evi· 
dence to first ascertain that there was an easy known 
and convenient route around it. There is no such evi-
dence before the court at the present time and the court 
cannot speculate as to the extent of the danger and what 
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the plaintiff either knew or should have known absent 
testimony relative to these matters. 
Furthermore, the Wold case can be clearly distin-
guished from the Corbridge case. In the Wold situation 
the plaintiffs were well aware of the nature of the ex-
cavation in front of their home, they were present when 
the excavation was made, they knew it was there, they 
knew the extent of the construction and likewise they 
were familiar with their neighborhood and knew how 
far and in what direction they would have to go around 
or the skirt the dangerous condition. No such situation 
txisted in the Corbridge case. The plaintiff, Mrs. Cor-
bridge, simply knew by virtue of the fact that there were 
detour signs, that there was some construction taking 
place in that vicinity. (Dep. p. 7) She did not know 
and had no reason to know there was an excavation and 
she had no way of knowing which alternative route she 
might take to avoid or to lessen the dangerous situation 
in which she found herself. She was forced to make 
a choice of alternative routes in which to travel and 
she knew not the number of alternatives or the risk in-
volved in any or all of them. 
It is also significant that the court said in Wold 
v. Ogden City, at page 455, 
·'This court is charged with the duty of protect-
ing all of the rights of all litigants." 
To grant a motion for summary judgment without 
first having heard the evidence is not protecting the 
15 
rights of any of the litigants. The court conti'n d 
ue 'lt page 456, ' 
"Plaintiff's conduct, aside from the conce t . 
th . f . k p lJl e assumption o ris , was unreasonable i '-] 
light of this known hazard and the existencen L
1
.1e . o a 
convement, hardly burdensome detour at tli · . f e in-
tersection o Grant and 18th ~treet, where tht 
tr~nch ended and thr~u~h. wluch plaintiff had 
driven shortly before his InJU~Y· To deliberately 
attempt to cross under such circumstances seen~ 
to be that kind of lack of due care not attribut-
able to the ordinary prudent person exercising 
care for his own safety." 
The significant factors in this court's finding, how-
ever, are a known hazard, the existence of a convenient. 
hardly burdensome detour, and that the plaintiff had 
driven on it shortly before his injury. These are all 
facts that were known in the Wold situation, but un-
known in the Corbridge case. As such, the Wold decision 
should certainly not be controlling here. 
POINT V 
A PERSON CONFRONTED WITH AN 
EMERGENCY SHOULD NOT BE HELD TO 
THE SAME STANDARD OF CARE AS UN-
DER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Plaintiffs do not contend that the plaintiff Dorlene 
Corbridge faced an emergency where she was obligated 
to act instantaneously without giving some thought to 
her course of conduct. However, she was certainly faced 
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with a situation which would give rise to anxiety, a cer-
tain amount of fear, and great concern for herself and 
her children, particularly in view of the fact that she 
had to leave her children on a public highway late at 
night in the dark, without supervision or protection. It 
is obvious that this was necessary if she was to secure 
help in getting her automobile functioning again so that 
she could return with her children to their home. She 
necessarily had to pull her automobile off the traveled 
portion of the highway, place it in an area where it 
would be somewhat protected and then proceed herself 
to get help. 
This principle stated above is well established in 
Utah. See Schlatter v. McCarthy, et al., 113 Utah 543, 
196 P.2d 968 (1948), at page 971, 
"It is a well settled rule that a person con-
fronted with a sudden emergency who chooses 
a course of conduct to avoid the danger such as a 
person of ordinary prudence might make under 
similar circumstances, is not guilty of contrib-
utory negligence, even though it subsequently 
appears that another course of action might have 
avoided or ameliorated the injury." 
17 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant respectfully urges that the d · · ec1s1 011 
of the lower court be reversed and the matter rein tl 
. . . an ed 
for trial. To do otherwise is to ignore the plaintiff' 
affidavit and her deposition in which it is clearly o\i ' 
•J 01111 
that she was unaware of the excavation, that it was dark 
and the excavation could not be seen by her, that tht' · 
alternate route over the detour road was dangerous 
and to further deprive her of her day in court without 
having first been given an opportunity to produce eii-
dence relative to the physical nature of the constructioit 
site. Neither the Lower Court nor this Court knows the 
exact nature of the construction area and the Yariou, 
perils or alternatives available to the plaintiff at the time 
of her injury. And taking the facts as she states them 
to be, her actions were not unreasonable and did 1wr 
deviate from the standard expected of the ordinm , 
reasonable person under the circumstances. 
Her experience in the general vicinity of the con-
struction site was very limited having passed through 
it only once within the last six months she could not 
reasonably be expected to know the exact nature of the 
construction. Absent any lighting devices, barriers, or 
barricades, and having felt nothing unusual about the 
roadway as she walked toward her benefactor's car, haY· 
ing seen no other equipment, cement forms, or materials ' 
of any kind, we cannot say as a matter of law that her 
actions were unreasonable and deprive her of an oppor· 
tunity to prove her case. The authorities cited by the 
18 
defendant and respondent are not applicable to this 
case and should not be controlling. On the basis of the 
authorities cited by the plaintiff and appellant the de-
cision of the Lower Court ought to be reversed and the 
plaintiff given an opportunity to present her case to 
11 jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FROERER, HOROWITZ, PARKER, 
RICHARDS, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellants 
200 Kiesel Building, Ogden, Utah 
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